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Social Policy and Conflict: Gezi Park-Taksim Demonstrations and Uses of Social Policy 
for Reimagining Turkey  
Hakan Seckinelgin, Department of Social Policy, LSE 
The article is interested in the ways in which social policy debates, both on particular policy 
ideas and on policy implementation, are instrumental in understanding socio-political 
conflicts. In discussing citizenship and the gains obtained by citizens in changing welfare 
provision Bryan S. Turner argues that ‘the welfare state in Britain after the Second World war 
and the civil rights movement in America after the Vietnam war  were both responses to the 
mobilization of society and to its self-critical reflection’.1  This view considers conflict in 
general, not limited to war, as a productive force within which new ideas are developed and 
new social relations are articulated. It is a view shared by others who consider conflict an 
essential part of social change. For them the nature of social change is often related to how 
conflict is managed and mediated.
2
 I argue that social policy plays a central role in this 
management process. Another relevant aspect of this relationship between conflict and social 
policy is considered by Richard Titmuss. He argued in 1955 that ‘war has been an essential 
stimulus to national self-criticism and social change’.3 He traces the productive relationship 
between war and social policy and considers the impact of ‘deliberate attempts to organize a 
society for a war’ even at peacetime.4 He argues that the changing nature of modern warfare 
focused states’ interests ‘in time of war with biological characteristics of its people’.5 This 
thinking allows us to consider the way in which social policy changes are linked with critical 
events in a society and how a focus on them allows us to analyse and understand critical 
initiatives to change a society.   
With these views in mind here I analyse the Gezi Events of May-June 2013 in 
Istanbul Turkey. On 28 May 2013 Gezi Park, which is adjacent to Istanbul’s central square, 
Taksim Square, become a contested space.  In opposing the planned urban development that 
would have seen the park replaced by a large new old building, a replica of an Ottoman 
building that occupied the same location in the past, civil society groups occupied the park 
and confronted the police forces. Here, my aim is to highlight the important role played by 
social policy ideas and attempts to implement some of these policies by exacerbating already 
existing conflicts in society, which lead to this confrontation from May to the middle to the 
end of June 2013. There were an estimated 5000 demonstrations across Turkey with up to 3.5 
million people participating.
6
 In the process, police use of tear/pepper gas and water cannons 
had come to represent Turkish government’s brutal attitude towards its citizens. Thousands of 
people were gassed regularly and arrested during the events. Even after the end of the events 
hundreds who either participated or supported the events through social media are still being 
followed, tried and losing their jobs. For instance, the daily Radikal reported on 12 May 2014 
that two lecturers were made redundant in Marmara University after a long investigation into 
the way they condoned student action during the Gezi events within the university campus.
7
  
The political confrontations observed in the Gezi events reveal social policies as a 
domain of conflict as protestors appeared to challenge the promotion of a certain socio-
political change that reimagines Turkish society. My aim is not to suggest that the use of 
social policy for reimagining is a new phenomenon in the Turkish context. On the contrary, 
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social policies on women’s lives, education and even the dress code, were used as central 
mechanisms through which in the 1920s a new Turkey was imagined at the end of the World 
War I with the emergence of the new Turkish Republic.  I argue that the Gezi events 
highlight the tensions created by the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi- Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) government’s use of social policy as a tool for challenging since 2002 the past 
reimagining in Turkey towards a new thinking about the nature of the society. As observed 
by Umut Bozkurt, for instance AKP has used social security and social assistance programs 
since 2002 to increase its appeal within the broader Turkish society with the hope that the 
AKP can create a technical, non-political, consensus to rule the country independent of its 
Islamic orientation.
8
  What is interesting in Bozkurt’s analysis for the present article is the 
way in which social assistance policies are framed, on the one hand, to appear to target and 
include everyone in the society and on the other hand aim to underwrite the broader 
ideological ambitions of the AKP. Thus, this article considers social policy both as one of the 
grounds of conflict and as one of the tools for the negotiation of the nature of citizenship and 
belonging in a given society.  
There are many ways to think about what is meant by social policy.
9
 Thandika 
Mkandawire’s definition here is helpful, it considers social policy as ‘action in society 
towards a certain change’.10 If we consider social policies as interventions in society to 
change it, Desmond King’s social policy thinking is also pertinent. He considers social 
policies as ‘purposeful programmes, associated with political ideologies and programmatic 
ambitions to modify individuals’ behaviour and society’.11 This allows for analyses of the 
way in which social policies become enactments of particular political positions and then 
become domains of negotiation for various political positions. In addressing this relationship 
King argues that ‘[p]oliticians acting within the constraints of democratic institutions, 
willingly use ideas to serve their ends, whether short-term electoral ones or grander 
ideological ambitions’.12  Social policies are produced by political actors working with 
particular social groups and grounded in a way of thinking about a society, or based on an 
ideology of being and relating to each other in that society.  Approached in this way social 
policies, their negotiations and the conflicts created by them become methodological entry 
points to assess and understand competing aspirations for social change in a given society. In 
this view the assessment of policies engages with socio-political domains within which 
policies are articulated and with the kinds of views on society they encapsulate. When 
reactions to policies are observed  within the broader societal context, the emergent 
discussions and conflicts on these within civil society reveal competing visions of social 
change in that society. Social policies allow a re-imaging of society, not only as they 
gradually restructure both relations among individuals and groups but also as they restructure 
the relationship between individuals and the society. The severity of these discussions or 
conflicts highlight the commitment of various groups to particular social visions.  I consider 
the Gezi events from this angle, as a confrontation that highlights conflicting visions 
manifested in particular social policy discussions where the stakes are about the way people’s 
lives are reconsidered and recast by the AKP government’s social policies in Turkey. 
Following King’s definition I consider the AKP government’s social policies as representing 
an ideological position that presents a challenge to the way in which everyday life has been 
framed broadly within the Kemalist secular ideology in Turkey. The protestors’ reactions 
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frame the AKP government’s social policies as attempts to change the larger society 
according to a model implicitly grounded on Islamic orientation.  
In Turkey the ideal of a multi-party democratic institutional model, with election 
campaigns, rule of law and policy proposals linked with political parties, provides the context 
for the socio-political processes to negotiate the relevance of a desired social change in 
society. However, the Gezi protests question the space available for socio-political 
negotiation within the democratic governance process. They raise issues on the ways in 
which government has promoted and implemented its policies for the broader society. King 
points out that ‘policies all entail the state directing some citizens’ behaviour or choices 
(whether quasi-voluntarily or compulsorily), interventions which may affect levels of trust in 
the government’.13  Here the nature of this directing and legitimacy of the process, in other 
words the nature of the governance, through which it is negotiated is central to the way social 
policies are seen either beneficial/legitimate or not. Although Bo Rothstein argues that ‘it is 
scarcely possible to carry out a program successfully if it does not enjoy the confidence of the 
group towards which it is directed, or of the citizens at large’,14 one needs to consider the 
ground on which the confidence of a government is built. Rothstein’s view raises a central 
issue: do elected governments need, for their policy interventions, to have the confidence of 
the citizens at large even if many did not vote for the particular government programme? The 
style of this relationship with the broader citizenry is observed in the way social policies are 
developed, promoted, implemented and the way a government takes into account the 
reactions of the citizens as demonstrated in civil society discussions. This analysis provides a 
way of understanding the interaction between the government and the protestors at the Gezi 
events as contesting the government’s attempts to re-imagine the society.  
Considering the way in which the Gezi events, both in Istanbul and across Turkey, 
emerged in a city square and in relation to a city square there is a tendency to link these 
events with the occupy movement or the Arab Springs.
15
 I diverge from these approaches, in 
particular as regards to the latter events, given the democratic institutional context within 
which the Gezi events took place in Turkey.
16
  The role of that context for understanding both 
the emergence, the content of the confrontation and its implications is central. Furthermore, 
these approaches by claiming similarity with other places do not allow an analysis to 
understand why people’s reactions exploded at the end of May 2013 across Turkey: Why did 
these events happen, at that time? In this article, I consider the way in which people’s 
reactions are linked with the intersection of everyday lives and the AKP government’s social 
policy initiatives that are increasingly framing these everyday lives. I consider social policy 
as the domain of this intersection as the government uses policies to inform a particular way 
of orienting individuals’ every day context.  I argue that people’s reactions during the Gezi 
events represent the cumulative effect of policy pronouncements of the AKP government 
often delivered by the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and directly targeting the everyday 
lives of citizens in an attempt to regulate the boundaries of them on the basis of social 
policies. From Nikos Moudouros’ perspective this can also be framed as a reaction within 
parts of the Turkish society against the AKP government’s hegemony to rule and define the 
society.
17
 This hegemony, as argued by Moudouros, is built through the changing political 
language used by the AKP, primarily by its leader, in relation to the society and through the 
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way in which social policies, for instance as Moudouros points out on housing
18
, are enacted 
to support the imagined idea of the new Turkey in this process.  
In the following I begin by, first, presenting the events as they unfolded in May – June 
2013 around Gezi Park in Istanbul. I rely on media reports and observations made during the 
events through many media channels as well as a set of interviews conducted in Turkey in 
August and September 2013 with people who participated in demonstrations. In this I briefly 
look at the events and consider the way in which we can observe people’s dissatisfaction with 
the way the AKP government is trying to intervene in their lives through social policies. 
Focusing on the language used in the demonstrations and in the responses to them allow us an 
entry point to consider the role of social policy in shaping peoples’ feelings and frustrations 
that have motivated them either in participating or opposing to these events.
19
 Then in the 
following section I provide, linked to King, an analysis of how the reactions observed in 
demonstrations reveal the ideological sources of social policies and what is considered to be 
at stake in this conflictual event. The third section looks at the reactions by the government 
towards people’s demands. This highlights ways in which the event is interpreted within a 
particular political ideology to maintain momentum for social change linked with their 
particular social policies.  
 
The Gezi Events May/June 2014 
On 28 May 2013 many media outlets in Turkey reported that at midnight the local authority 
work machines began demolishing one of the walls of Gezi Park, a wall parallel to Asker 
Ocaği Street. Considering that this work allowed these machines to enter the park and it was 
assumed that they would destroy trees in the park, ‘50 members of a civil society group 
named Stand up for Taksim Platform (Taksim iҫin Ayağa Kalk Platformu) engaged with work 
machines to stop their work and waited until the morning in the park’.20The group hanged a 
poster from the trees that read ‘We are on the watch for Gezi Park’.21 On the morning of 28 
May police intervened to break up this group so that the work machines could get on with 
their task. In this confrontation the police were reportedly heavy handed and used pepper gas 
sprays to disperse the protesters. The work machines that were attempting to remove trees 
were finally stopped by ‘the intervention of Sırrı Süreyya Ӧnder a member of Turkish 
parliament from Peace and Democracy Party (Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi-BDP)’.22 The civil 
society group’s action is a clear evidence of ongoing discussions and reactions to the changes 
initiated around Taksim Square by the implementation of the city transformation polices of 
the local authority that were supported by the government. This reflects the engagement of 
civil society groups, trade unions, neighbourhood groups, political party representatives and 
related professional groups such as the Chamber of Architects in Istanbul since late 2011. 
Many groups coming together under the ‘Taksim Solidarity group designated the Chamber of 
Architects Greater City office and Istanbul Chamber of City Planners as their secretariat at 
their meeting on 25 February 2012’. The group expressed its purpose as to engage and 
challenge the ‘policies presented by the Prime Minister to public as “pedestrianisation” and 
“revival/development” policies’ as being in breach of scientific, technical and legal 
considerations that will destroy both Taksim Square and Gezi’.23  The step towards more 
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organized engagement at this stage provides evidence of the technical and professional 
engagement with the local authority through various mechanisms that included legal 
challenges to the plans and court cases. Yet it also signifies a fundamental distrust in the 
political governance of this policy process to which they think a broader public challenge is 
needed.  
On the third day of the Gezi events the police was constantly trying to stop protestors 
engaging the work machines by using water cannons and firing pepper gas at them and 
attempting to break their tents and the camp within the park. While police was dispersing the 
protestors the work machines resumed their work. Sırrı Süreyya Ӧnder again intervened and 
stopped the machines by standing in front of them. The intervention methods of the police are 
violent, using armoured vehicles called the Mass Incident Intervention Vehicle (TOMA) on 
which they have water cannons and also constantly firing pepper gas canisters on the 
protesters in the park. This style of intervention already in the early few days resulted in 
many injuries.  This violent pattern of formal response demonstrated by the police was 
repeated in the following days with increased ferocity. The aim was to show the 
government’s resolve to get its way to go ahead with its rebuilding plans for Gezi Park. In the 
meantime violent confrontation with protesters who appeared to be peacefully sitting in the 
park had generated an image of violence which increased the numbers of protestors not only 
in Istanbul but in the rest of Turkey with protests to support the Gezi in many parts of the 
country. As a result, over the following days the protest in the Park grew with many people 
spending days and nights in the park which become a protected zone with its kitchens, library 
and many discussion groups attracting more and more people into the area.  In some ways it 
become a centre of attraction on multiple issues but also dominantly a place to discuss 
environmental issues. Gradually, the wide long steps going down from the Park to Taksim 
square were barricaded as the square was full of police and TOMAs.  
One of the first formal responses from the government came from Minister for 
Forestry and Waterworks Minister Veysel Eroğlu.  Reportedly, he said that ‘Gezi Park is a 
small area’ and added ‘that there was only a limited number of trees’. He then promised ‘to 
plant “a hundred times more trees than are cut” in Gezi Park elsewhere’ and added that ‘they 
had decided to plant 5 million trees in Istanbul’.24 While events both around the Park and the 
supporting protests across the country were increasing in their numbers the Prime Minister 
Erdoğan only provided dismissive remarks and argued that the police was doing its job to 
protect citizens and their property. His main response came on 2 June 2013. He said that ‘In 
the Taksim square we are working on the pedestranization and we will do it… the Artillery 
Barracks built in the reign of Selim III in 1780 was demolished by the CHP (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi-Republican People’s Party) logic and the space was used as a stadium. We will 
rebuild historic barracks in that space’. He then added that ‘inşallah we will demolish the 
AKM (Ataturk Cultural Centre- which housed Istanbul opera and concert halls until it was 
shut down for renovations in 2008). We will build an impressive opera building to replace it’. 
At that moment someone from the audience said also a mosque and the PM says ‘Yes. We 
will also build a mosque. I am not going to get permission for these from either the secretary 
general of CHP or from few ҫapulcu. Those who voted for us already authorised us to do 
these things. Commenting on the Gezi events he added that ‘I am clearly stating that we 
won’t let few ҫapulcu to incite the public in that square. This nation voted for us to protect 
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their history and environment’.25 The word ҫapulcu is worthwhile to consider. It can be 
translated into English as looters, raiders or more generally as riffraff. It denotes in Turkish 
use particularly condescending view of people who are seen generally as no use to society. It 
is a remarkable choice of word by the PM in the middle of a major public unrest across the 
country. Furthermore, its use at this instance creates one of the breaking points in this 
process. It is sufficient to say that protesters across the country begun to use the word to 
define themselves and in the process attributed a new meaning to it by creating a verb, 
ҫapuling in Turkish or, chapulling in English to mean seeking their own rights from political 
authority and reminding them their purpose. The role of social media in the emergence of 
chapulling is undeniable as in one case Noam Chomsky is seen on a youtube video sitting 
next to a   poster saying ‘I am also a ҫapulcu’.26 This intervention by Erdoğan fuelled further 
protests in many places. While many thought that it was provocative as they were exercising 
their democratic right to voice their disagreement, for the people who are living in and around 
Taksim and who though that they have direct interest in what happens to the park, it was 
aggravating. Already by 2 June the Council of the Association of Turkish Doctors reported 
that there had been 1000 injured across the country.
27
  
The next day on 3 June 2013 just before Erdoğan left Turkey on a formal visit to 
North Africa he gave another speech and answered some questions from the journalist at the 
Ataturk Airport in Istanbul. While his speech was broadly talking about the economic 
successes and other achievements of his government, journalists’ questions were more 
interested in his views on the Gezi events. Given its content it is important to look at it 
closely. The PM’s main argument can be observed in the following answer to a question 
about his assessment of the events: ‘Is this the Turkish Spring? These news are imaginary, 
they are written by people who do not know Turkey. Look at the countries of Arab spring do 
they have multiparty democracy? This is the participation to an action organized by radical 
groups. This is nothing to do with Gezi Park or with trees being destroyed. We have moved 
10 trees most of these are relocated and two died. I explained our targets about Gezi Park in 
2011 was there any voice for two years no one said anything. We are pedestrianizing the area, 
these actions are internally and externally linked games [against us and Turkey]….this is not 
about destroying trees this is about the artillery barracks, the administrators are protecting 
history. Behind all these actions there is the CHP logic’. A Reuters journalist Birsen Altayli 
asked where the PM is getting the idea that the people demonstrating were radicals 
ideologically linked with internal and external power domains. She said that we see 
housewives, young people from all walks of life presenting their problems in the 
demonstrations on everyday question of education, health, ban on alcohol and other things. 
This sparked a response which characterized the PM’s general attitude towards the Gezi 
events in a much more confrontational manner: ‘Don’t say society. I understand if you say 
part of the society. In all our regions there are extensions of particular ideologies. There are 
the representatives of main opposition party (CHP) across Turkey. They might have brought 
those out. Radical elements are also in these areas. As a member of this society you should 
ask what is happening here why this is happening now.  This is CHP. Don’t university people 
have ideology? At the moment there is a 50 % of this country we are trying to contain with 
difficulty. We are telling them not to give into provocations. You are talking about education. 
We have taken unprecedented steps to improve education in this country. You are informing 
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Reuters in this manner…I have not seen anything about education there in the 
demonstrations. There is no ban on alcohol, there is the regulation. We are trying to find a 
way of reducing traffic accidents. The primary reason of this is alcohol use’.28  
In this answer the PM adds a new dimension to his labelling of protestors as ҫapulcu a 
day before.  He is arguing that protestors have well-designed political plans against his 
government and against people who elected his government and that these plans are linked 
with foreign interests.
29
  In these statements the PM presents his assessment of the situation 
by challenging the demonstrators across the country. His challenge is based on showing his 
government’s economic and electoral successes as the grounds of legitimacy for his policy 
initiatives. His language suggests that his social policy discussions are for the good of the 
society in general even though some parts of the society have different views on these issues. 
These statements combined with the police brutality on the ground were a watershed moment 
in the Gezi events. His approach for many was a significant evidence for moves towards 
limiting people to express their opposition to AKP policies. While the number of protestors 
increased over time and they indeed initially focused most of their efforts on the 
environmental issue and saving the Gezi Park, the PM’s explicit position shifted the debate 
more into the area of policy governance and the role of political rights and freedoms to 
engage in political debate within that governance process.   
On 15 June 2013 after the PM gave a speech in Ankara in which he said that ‘either 
protesters leave Taksim otherwise our security forces know how to empty it’.30 In the evening 
the police entered the park in Taksim with significant brutality, using gas and water cannons 
even against those who were trying to hide in buildings that included a hotel and a hospital in 
the area. While they claimed to have controlled Gezi Park demonstrations, streets across 
Turkey remained tense for following weeks.  In Istanbul, for instance, well into the autumn of 
2013 these events created a political momentum within civil society. Many people regularly 
met in local parks or other spaces to discuss social and political that were at the heart of the 
events. Given this was the period leading to local elections in Turkey, some of the local 
candidates for office in Istanbul attended these meetings to be questioned by participants and 
to present their political agenda.   
 
Social Policy in the Gezi Events 
People’s voices during these events demonstrated the diversity of backgrounds and different 
ways in which social policy interventions were impacting their lives. However, the shift in 
the mood of the protestors discussed above is also observed in the posters and slogans used 
by them. In addition to many environmental statements that initially dominated the discussion 
such as ‘Capitalists cut trees when they cannot sell their shade’ to ‘these trees will still be 
here when you are gone’ and ‘People do not approve the destruction of Gezi Park’, people’s 
focus moved towards a more general confrontation with the AKP government’s policies and 
its governance style. Here I will use number of slogans as an entry point for the analyses. 
Many of these policy areas are about personal choices and private life.  In this issues that 
target women’s lives were particularly important.  One read ‘Tayyip do you want three more 
kids like us’ this was engaging with the PM’s long standing campaign to motivate families to 
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increase the number of children they want to have to three. In a similar vein other posters 
carried by women read ‘I make love but I don’t marry, I get pregnant but don’t have a baby’, 
‘Tayyip hands off my body’, ‘Abortion is a right’ and ‘we don’t want anti-women PM’ were 
all targeting the language of policy used by the PM in discussing possible policy changes 
before the Gezi events. On many occasions the PM expressed his clear views on women and 
significantly his aims to regulate women’s lives by signalling a new way of thinking on laws 
regulating abortion procedures in Turkey.  
The newly introduced alcohol regulation system was occupying people’s minds as yet 
another interference with everyday lives. The PM has used alcoholic drink consumption as a 
derogatory behaviour in his many speeches targeting opposition to him. One slogan read 
‘You banned the alcohol, the nation sobered up’ while another one said ‘grandchildren of two 
drunks are coming’ this was a reference to the PM’s derogatory speech in the parliament on 
28 May 2013 where he argued that ‘a law made by two drunks are legitimate for you but why 
a law proposed by the truths established by religious belief is not’.31 This statement created a 
major debate as to who he was referring to as two drunks whether it was an implicit reference 
to Atatürk and İnӧnü founders of the republic or not. The new law that regulates selling of 
alcoholic drinks was announced on 11 June 2013 in the Official Bulletin
32
 and came into 
effect on 9 September 2013. It banned retailers to sell alcoholic drinks between 22:00 pm and 
6:00am and does not allow these to be sold around or near to schools or places of worship. 
Furthermore, the advertisement of alcoholic drinks in all media including internet was 
banned.  Here, the issue is the way in which this regulation was introduced leading to its 
announcement. Considering that according to the WHO, in Turkey the alcohol consumption 
rate is 3.4 % per capita, this might be considered to be far too low for requiring such strict 
regulation. Erdoğan’s well established dislike of alcoholic drinks is considered to be 
underwriting the policy rather than just being about the impact of alcohol consumption on 
individual health as has been promoted. It is seen as a continuation of a program which begun 
in 2002 under AKP government. The situation is linked with the gradual increase of tax on 
alcoholic drinks introduced by the AKP government since 2002 according to a report by 
Euromonitor cost of traditional drink rakı increased from 9.15 Turkish lira in 2002 to 51 lira 
in 2012 while in the tax on beer rose 737 % between 2002 and 2009.
33
  
Why are these policy issues, such as family planning, city planning, or the link 
between health and alcoholic drink consumption so contentious? In these policy areas the 
government has appeared to be in consultation with various civil society groups and no doubt 
there are divergent views on what should be the substance of policies in these fields. Many of 
these policies are introduced through the proper parliamentary procedure. Therefore, one can 
consider the location of these debates to be within the conventional policy process rather than 
being on the streets in a great confrontation with the political authority. The contention is 
created in the way these issues are presented to public as policy concerns and then 
implemented as policy interventions. In other words, the governance of social policy has 
become as contentious as the content of these policies.  The PM has personally appeared as 
the main promoter of most of the ideas underpinning policies from regulations on abortion to 
pronouncing on how ayran, a yogurt based drink and not rakı, an alcohol based drink, was 
the Turkish traditional drink and commented on people’s personal choices directly. So, in the 
Gezi demonstrations direct reactions to the PM’s style of governance were dominant. 
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Underlying this is the unease about the fact that the AKP government has the majority share 
of the parliament and the President of the Republic, Abdulah Gül, whose approval is sought 
for all laws to be implemented was one of the founders of the AKP party. The unease was 
about the integrity of the democratic process which was used by the PM to justify his 
policies. As a result the policy process was seen as driven by the PM and his ideas without 
many checks and balances. Many slogans were linking his personal style of politics and the 
impact of this on the broader governance issues. The link between police use of pepper gas, 
its brutality and the apparent ease with which the PM justified police interventions is 
recognized in the following and similar slogans that read ‘chemical Tayyip’. There were 
many slogans questioning the engagement with citizens by using force in this way. Another 
one read ‘Don’t touch my home, my city, and my living space’ questioning the government’s 
claimed right to intervene in people’s living spaces.  
The presence of the LGBT people in the Gezi Park was also linked with the 
governance aspects of the situation. Their interventions were disrupting the AKP 
government’s democratic language by pointing out the constitutional change initiated to 
further bolster democratization in Turkey did not address their freedoms and rights as LGBT 
people.  One of their slogans read ‘To live is to resist, LBGT are on the streets’ while another 
one read ‘I am faggot, I am trans, I am lesbian, I am sex worker, I am in Gezi and I am 
resisting’ these were significant claims to have a voice in ongoing political debates. LGBT 
campaign to influence the constitutional change was not successful in particular the new 
constitution does not protect people against discrimination and violence based on sexual 
identity. The government ignored many campaigning to include these considerations as part 
of the new criminal justice package in the new constitution. While the government is trying to 
regulate women’s lives in a particular way to redefine the nature of the Turkish society, 
LGBT people were highlighting the fact that the same government by not tackling sexuality-
based violence and crimes is effectively excluding them from its policy considerations and as 
a result from politics in general. Another slogan located what was happening at the time into 
the broader context of changes that was initiated in the previous year and it read ‘This 
resistance is not only about Gezi Park, it is for two drunks, for Reyhanli, for 19 May and 29 
October celebration of which are banned and for people run out of patience’. The statement 
identifies set of changes introduced in public life since 2012 that included restrictions on 
public celebrations of national holidays associated with the republic. The last part of this 
statement is particularly significant in highlighting the threshold at which the relationship 
between the PM and the citizens has become questionable. These demonstrations become 
statements about ‘not to be governed thusly’.34 Social policies come to signify unacceptable 
governance of everyday life.  
 
What do these reactions indicate?  
It is clear that protestors see social policy change in the areas identified above as 
interventions either on their everyday lives or the potential removal of already gained rights 
as demonstrated in the case of abortion question. Given that many people do not react to 
social policy changes in this manner the Gezi events underline the clash with an alternative 
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interpretation on various policy interventions. Protestors consider many policies initiated by 
the AKP government as embodying implicit attempts to change a way of living beyond the 
claimed technical substance of these policies. Here, a closer look at this interpretation will 
highlight the ideological stakes in the confrontations around the Gezi Park.  As the slogan 
mentioned above locating the Gezi events in the broader context highlights, social policy 
interventions are taking place in the broader context of the AKP government’s engagement 
with the Turkish military and what it sees as a particularly didactic secular nationalism that 
framed socio-political life in Turkey since 1920s. As I discuss elsewhere the AKP 
government has confronted this Kemalist secularism and the way it has regulated everyday 
life in Turkey.
35
 The contention has been about the way in which the Kemalist-secular 
political ideology excluded people who were diverging from this position, in particular those 
who have religious positions determining their everyday lives in the society by excluding 
them from having a voice in public life in Turkey. Since 2002, this confrontation has 
manifested itself on the debates about the ban on women with headscarves from having 
access to university education. The AKP government engaged with this issue head on and 
expanded its policy focus to open up the public participation of women with headscarves 
starting with education leading into areas including courts, civil service and the parliament. 
This issue was a critical challenge for many secular people in terms of their Turkish identity 
which had been broadly enforced by the state. In addition, long-drawn court cases brought 
against the high ranking serving and retired military officers have occupied Turkish public 
discussion since 2007.
36
 The officers were tried with treason charges accusing them with 
planning a coup d’état against the elected government. This is considered to be another step 
towards the further democratisation of the society by removing the influence of military as 
the defender of the Kemalist secular state.  
The possibility of doing politics without the threat from the military marked a major 
change from the past. In line with this the AKP led a constitutional reform process that aimed 
to change the particular aspects of the 1980 constitution written after the military coup. This 
new civilian direction become a lever used by Erdoğan to justify other policy initiatives. It is 
highlighted in his above discussed press conference on 3 June 2013. In it he points out that 
that ‘[W]e have been servants of our nation not their masters. Economic indicators are 
growing our GDP was 3500 US dollars and now it is 10500 US dollars. They don’t want us 
to achieve this we are going beyond modernity, they are trying to stop us, we love our nation, 
we’ll follow our path together with our people’.37 The first sentence here is an important 
denotation to show his difference from the past in which, according to him, a political class 
together with military isolated themselves from the people and aimed to maintain a particular 
nationalism at all costs. This view signals a change in politics that engages with people’s 
everyday concerns and lives. This is reiterated constantly, as it is here, in reference to how 
AKP government brought economic prosperity into people’s lives.  
By using the economic prosperity argument together with his success in 
democratization process in isolating the influence of military, the PM has presented his views 
on social policy in a number of areas to change the society. For instance, in a speech given at 
the International Parliamentarians Conference on the Action Plan for Population and 
Development Conference in 24 May 2012 in Istanbul he argued that: ‘As Turkey we are very 
sensitive about children. I love children. I want at least three children in my country. Because 
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I know that we need young dynamic population and we are working on this. I also want to 
state this clearly, I am a Prime Minister who is against caesarean section at birth. I see 
abortion as a murder. No one should have a right to allow this. You either kill the child in the 
womb or after the birth, there is no difference. We ought to be very sensitive to this. We have 
to cooperate against this’.38 It was very clear in the following days this was not just 
Erdoğan’s view but it was the direction of his government as he repeated this argument in 
many political forums and announced that the government established a working group to 
develop a new policy. The new policy would change the existing law that allowed women to 
have abortion up to 10 weeks in public hospitals. Also, in a similar vein the working group 
would consider how to regulate caesarean section provision which is generally based on the 
decision of the pregnant women. Since then in the light of major opposition from many 
medical professionals, policy experts and women groups neither a new abortion law nor the 
caesarean section regulation have been implemented. However, the discussion is still used by 
the Kemalist opposition as a sceptre indicating a danger, as in the Gezi events. This was also 
highlighted by an intervention from a female CHP member of parliament who called on 
Erdoğan that it is the time to ‘stop policing vaginas’.39 What is at stake in this discussion is 
the role of women to decide about their lives. The existing law allows women to be in control 
of their lives while in opposition to this the AKP appears to consider women’s lives in 
relation to their role in the family. This particular angle was revealed in his speech at an event 
organized by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy to introduce their new project of 
Becoming a Family on 17 June 2013. According to the reports he talked about ‘the identity of 
AKP as a conservative democrat and said that their fundamental target is the family’. He then 
argued that ‘[i]n this country for years they implemented birth control mechanism. They 
almost neutered our people. Caesarean section and abortion are all about this. When they 
were doing these they almost committed murder. Almost conned people. We need to break 
this game, as a result families in this country have a big role’.40 Here, it is clear that the PM 
and AKP are recasting women’s role according a rather conservative and restricted 
understanding of family. It is within that context that they defend rights of women, for 
instance to have access to education and take public offices, and bring all women a new 
dignity.  
The PM and his government have developed social policies that aim to introduce new 
regulations to protect people while at the same time recast social relations in the society from 
a conservative-paternalistic position. This is evident in Erdoğan’s comments on alcohol 
regulation given on 2 June 2012. He said that ‘I love my people. I don’t want them to be 
alcoholics ...I consider it to be my duty to intervene on this. Before us they passed 58. Article 
of the constitution. It says that we have to take measures to protect young people. There is an 
obligation. They say that I am against it because of the religious edicts. If this is a very good 
thing for the people and the society, the religion does not order us to do things that are not 
beneficial. Why should not I do as it says? Is this a bad thing? We are a conservative- 
democratic Party. We express our views with absolute clarity…[people] should know that 
because I am concerned about their health I am involved in this. I am doing all this because I 
love my citizens.
41
 Here, the PM was essentially using the justification of an idea of 
protecting young people included in the constitution to develop a policy that is substantively 
based on his religious understanding of the role of alcohol in the society. In this he seems to 
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show that he is acting within the boundaries of the secular constitution while his reason of 
doing so is located in religion.  
These kinds of linkages between what initially is presented as technical social policy 
interventions and the reasons as to why the PM and the government consider these to be 
relevant policies on the basis of deeper ideological grounds are clearly observed by people. 
Furthermore, between the PM’s pronouncements and convergence in the arbitrary application 
of existing polices is witnessed. It is this dynamic between policies as technical solutions, 
their particular ideological justifications and what seems to be experienced by people as 
policies in their everyday lives is creating the unease and leading to confrontations. There are 
two important parallel issues here: a) for some protestors these public pronouncements by the 
PM justifying social policies are signals for a fundamental structural change in the way 
Turkish secular identity is cast; b) for some the divergence between technical policy 
formulations and their ideological justifications create a distrust in the governance style and 
the direction of the PM and AKP. Furthermore, this distrust is about the PM’s paternalistic 
attitude towards people’s everyday lives which is associated with arbitrariness in policy 
implementation.    
The abortion debate is an informative example of this situation. As discussed earlier 
the PM made his position clear and many women protestors during the Gezi events were 
tackling his position. Then, on March 2014 Turkish Gynaecology and Obstetrics Association 
announced controversially that ‘abortion procedure that is provided free up to10 weeks within 
the social protection system in the public hospitals linked to Ministry of Health is ended’. 
They argued that this happened as ‘the online health registration code for this particular 
procedure is removed from the system. As a result doctors cannot perform the procedure 
without getting authorization from the system leading to stopping all relevant inspections and 
procedures in this area’.42  This particular situation attracted  a lot of attention from health 
practioners as well as from civil society grops that also complainted about the problem.The 
president of the above association Prof. Dr. S. Cansun Demir called on the ministery to 
explain what appears to be an unlawful intervention into women’s health. In response to these 
on 12 March 2014 Ministery of Health issued a statement in which they explained the legal 
status of abortion and then said that ‘there is no restriction to have abortion procedure before 
10 weeks in hospitals linked to our miniteries’.43 On 17 March 2014 a small report by Çağla 
Ağırgöl and Burçak Cürül published on a civil society website. In order to test the system the 
authors went to register in two clinics attached to two different medical schools in Istanbul 
and were told at the registery of one of them that ‘this is a university hospital and demand-
based abortion is not done. It is banned’. Immediately afterwards talking to doctors  in the 
same clinic they were told that ‘[n]o there is no ban, we are on strike today. Come back on 
Monday and we’ll do the required paperwork’. They further note varying practices  within 
hospitals.
44
 Similar variations were also reported across the country.
45
 It is not clear in any of 
these reports what drives the professionals to implement the law in an appreantly  arbitrary 
fashion. However, paralles are drawn between the PM’s views on abortion and the arbitary  
decisions related with the implementation. Yet again, women’s social welfare issue become 
the contested grounds on which ideological debate is fought and political confronation takes 
place.  
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Conclusion  
In a way of concluding I will argue that Gezi events represent an ideological conflict on 
social change which is manifesting itself in social policies that are being promoted by the 
AKP government in Turkey. The Gezi events critically highlight both the way the political 
authority is using social policies to influence a socio-political change in Turkey and how 
protestors interpret this kind of instrumentalization of social policies.  For the protestors, the 
ongoing introduction of new social policies in contradiction to the Kemalist secular 
underpinnings of society and the arbitrary implementation of existing laws indicate that 
democratic institutions of the system are at their limits. In this conflict social policy is both 
used as evidence of unwanted ideological change motivating activism and as evidence for 
government’s democratic claims of inclusive governance. For Erdoğan and the AKP the 
ability to make and implement social policies in this transformative manner is a sign of their 
democratic credentials underwriting their political legitimacy. This democratic legitimacy 
claim is allowing Erdoğan to assert a consensual, and for some a hegemonic, pathway to 
shape the society through his policies. The same claim has also allowed him to reduce the 
diversity of protestors first as a homogenous group of ҫapulcullar and second as a group that 
is against the inclusive democratic change to ultimately dismiss their claims. This ideological 
clash revealed in social policy debates also highlight the current dynamics of politics in 
Turkey. 
The Gezi protestors clearly stated that they did not want to be governed by the AKP 
government. Arguably, they also implicitly asserted that the Kemalist republican ideology is 
the appropriate grounds of the democratic processes in Turkey. As a result, independent of 
the democratic process situating AKP’s policy interventions, the AKP and its supporters’ 
views become marginal to the governance in their Kemalist society, in their Turkey. In this 
the AKP supporters’ political voice is negated. This claim to govern at the expense of other’s 
political voices is at heart of the republican model of politics that is defined as ‘one of a 
system of institutions, laws and moral values that eliminate democratic excess by making 
state and society homogenous’.46 The Gezi protestors at times ‘unintentionally reified’ this 
model of state and its governance imperatives of the society.
47
  This position resolutely 
ignores that fact that the ideological position of Erdoğan and the AKP should be considered 
as a claim not to be governed thusly based on the lived experience within the Kemalist 
republican imagination. In other words the AKP policies represent an argument against that 
way of being governed. Therefore, their position is both a claim to have a political voice and 
be part of Turkey without agreeing to be citizens moulded in the Kemalist imagination. 
However, the discussions on social policies also reveal that both sides of the conflict are 
locked in the same political culture.  
While the ideological contention has solidified around particular policy issues, such as 
abortion impacting women’s everyday lives, both sides claim that their views should 
underwrite the values and norms of the society. Both sides’ social policies are advocating to 
organize the entire society by describing an ideal type of women.
48
  While Erdoğan is 
opposing to be governed by the Kemalist ideology, he is using the republican mechanism as 
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mentioned above to promote policies that will homogenize social relation in the society 
according to his own ideology. The tension here is about the way democratic life that is 
supposed to be about ‘pluralization’ is referenced to republican politics of consensus that 
aims to homogenizes the society.
49
 As Rancière points out that ‘consensus consists in the 
reduction of democracy to the way of life or ethos of a society, the dwelling and lifestyle of a 
specific group’.50 The creation of consensus and reduction of diverse ways of living for both 
sides are managed through social policies that control people’s everyday behaviour. From 
Akhil Gupta’s view this is a struggle ‘against currently hegemonic configurations of power of 
domination’ and ‘it involves a cultural struggle’ manifesting itself in this case through social 
policy debates.
51
 But contrary to Gupta’s argument and the AKPs language of being ‘counter-
hegemonic’, as suggested by Yel and Nas, their politics is not about ‘the transformation of 
the manner in which the state comes to be constructed’ it is rather about how to supplant one 
ideology over another one to utilize the existing oligarchic power of the state over the 
society.
52
  AKP’s language underwriting their policies has been about opening up the 
democracy to those who were made voiceless in the society. AKP seems to present itself as 
the ‘newcomer’ to the public sphere and aim to open the democratic politics to new issues 
and questions to challenge the state’s ‘claim to embody the sole principle of public life and in 
so doing be able to circumscribe the understanding and extension of life’.53  However, as 
evidenced both in their use of the state power, for instance the police, and justifications they 
give for their social policies, it is clear that AKP is more interested in establishing its own 
ideology as the organizing principle of the society. The challenge facing AKP then is to 
develop policies that are not hostage to one ideology or another but based on deliberative and 
inclusive non-hegemonic political processes.    
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